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MORAL HAZARD, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 
Abstract 
This paper provides an answer to the question of why agents make self-serving 
decisions under moral hazard and how their self-serving decisions can be kept in check 
through institutional arrangements. Our theoretical model predicts that the agents’ power and 
the manner in which they are held accountable jointly determine their propensity to make self-
serving decisions. We test our theory in the context of financial investment decisions made 
under moral hazard using others’ funds. Across three studies, using different decision-making 
tasks, different manipulations of power and accountability, and different samples, we show 
that agents’ power makes them more likely to behave in a self-serving manner under moral 
hazard, but only when the appropriate accountability mechanisms are not in place. 
Specifically, we distinguish between outcome and procedural accountability and show that 
holding agents accountable for their decision-making procedure reduces the level of self-
serving decisions under moral hazard and also curbs the negative consequences of power. 
Implications for decisions under moral hazard, the psychology of power, and the 
accountability literature are discussed. 
 
Keywords: moral hazard; accountability; power; investment decisions; unethical 
behavior. 
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Specialization and division of labor define modern social life. Consequently, many 
people relegate potentially life-changing decisions to agents who decide on their behalf. These 
agents are often tempted to make these decisions in a self-serving manner (Cupach & Carson, 
2002; Kurland, 1996; Ross, 1973; Sharma, 1997). Consider a hedge fund manager who 
typically invests others’ money and earns a performance-based commission in case of 
financial gains, but does not lose any personal funds if the investment produces a financial 
loss (Ackermann, McEnally, & Ravenscraft, 1999; Stulz, 2007). When facing a risky 
investment opportunity, the hedge fund manager has the incentive to invest as much of others’ 
funds as possible because doing so increases the investors’ potential gains without increasing 
potential losses. This situation is referred to as moral hazard (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Pauly, 
1968) and occurs whenever there is potential for “actions of economic agents in maximizing 
their own utility to the detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full 
consequences…of their actions” (Kotowitz, 2008). Because moral hazard is so pervasive, 
organizations try to contain the potential for self-serving behavior through institutional 
arrangements (rules, laws, customs) that make agents accountable for their decisions (Abbott, 
1983; Gaumnitz & Lere, 2002). 
Extant models of behavior under moral hazard are predicated on rational choice 
theory. Accordingly, they predict that all agents will make self-serving decisions under moral 
hazard, and if made accountable, all agents will face more costs in doing so, and engage in 
less self-serving decisions (e.g., Herweg, Muller, & Weinschenk, 2010; Holmstrom, 1979; 
Pauly, 1968). Yet, this explanation is not fully supported by empirical findings: Not all 
individuals make self-serving decisions under moral hazard (Chiappori, Durand, & Geoffard, 
1998; Dionne & St-Michel, 1991; Miller & Whitford, 2002), and not all accountability 
systems reduce self-serving behavior (Conlon & Parks, 1990; Dickinson & Villeval, 2008; 
Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997).  
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The goal of this paper is to elucidate which individuals are more likely to make self-
serving decisions under moral hazard, and how such problematic behavior can be effectively 
contained by accountability. We answer these questions by integrating the approach/inhibition 
theory of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) and the social contingency model of 
judgment and choice (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, 2003; Tetlock, 1985). This theoretical 
integration leads to predictions that power makes agents behave more self-servingly under 
moral hazard, but only when appropriate regulatory mechanisms are not in place. We 
emphasize the difference between accountability for outcomes and accountability for 
decision-making procedures (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), and 
propose that making agents accountable for their decision-making procedure is a more 
effective way of limiting self-serving decisions under moral hazard, and that this 
accountability type also offers a way to contain the self-serving consequences of power.  
We test our theory by examining how individuals make financial investment decisions 
under moral hazard on behalf of others. As much as half of all American families’ funds are 
invested by agents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) and these decisions have profound 
implications for people’s (financial) fate and the economy overall, making financial 
investment decisions under moral hazard a particularly relevant and representative context in 
which to test our theory (Dowd, 2009; Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 2000; Pauly, 1968). 
We report three studies in which we operationalized power, accountability, and investment 
decisions in different ways, allowing for a robust test of our theory. 
Our research makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. By proposing and 
testing a model explaining under which conditions individuals are more likely to make self-
serving decisions under moral hazard and how such behavior can be contained, our work 
advances extant theories of behavior under moral hazard (e.g., Herweg et al., 2010; 
Holmstrom, 1979; Pauly, 1968). In so doing, our research also contributes to the 
MORAL HAZARD, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4 
understanding of unethical and otherwise problematic behaviors in organizations more 
generally (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). We also address a problematic aspect 
of the literature on the psychological consequences of power (Guinote & Vescio, 2010; 
Keltner et al., 2003). Previous research has largely examined the effects of power without 
taking into consideration institutional arrangements that constrain its potentially self-serving 
consequences (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Yet, groups and organizations purposefully design 
accountability systems to keep self-serving behavior by the powerful in check (Beu & 
Buckley, 2001; Rawls, 2005; Rus, 2009). We demonstrate that power has different 
psychological effects depending on the manner in which the powerful are made accountable. 
We show that when the right social structures are in place, power is not necessarily a 
corruptive force. We also contribute to the accountability literature (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) 
by challenging the appropriateness of outcome accountability as the dominant form of 
accountability for regulating behavior in organizations and the broader society (Merchant & 
Van der Stede, 2007; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). Finally, our research may inform 
practitioners who want to regulate problematic employee behaviors (Beu & Buckley, 2001; 
Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998). 
Power and Self-Serving Decisions under Moral Hazard 
An important feature of decision making under moral hazard is the power of the agent, 
defined as the “capacity to modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources or 
administering punishment” (Keltner et al., 2003, p. 265). For example, some financial 
investors feel more powerful than others and claim to feel like “Masters of the Universe” 
(Das, 2011; McGee, 2011; Wolfe, 1987), perhaps because they control larger portfolios than 
others, belong to the market-leading firm, or simply because they are the “stars” in their 
company (Cohan, 2011; Kroijer, 2010). We argue that the psychological consequences of 
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power may help explain agents’ propensity to make self-serving decisions under moral 
hazard.  
How does power affect the propensity to make self-serving decisions under moral 
hazard? The approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) suggests that power 
makes individuals more focused on rewards and willing to pursue their personal interests, 
even when this comes at the expense of others’ interests. These psychological consequences 
of power are presumed to occur because the powerful are less constrained in their actions by 
their social context and are therefore free to focus on their own outcomes, which affects their 
psychology and behavior. Previous research examining behavior in different situations is 
consistent with this theory. For instance, Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, and Galinsky (2008) found 
that power increases individuals’ tendency to objectify other people and consider them as a 
means to achieving their own personal goals. Following this theory, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: Power leads to more self-serving investment decisions under moral 
hazard. 
A problematic aspect of past research on power is that it examined the consequences 
of power without taking into consideration the institutional arrangements that are intended to 
constrain its potentially self-serving consequences. Yet, groups and organizations 
purposefully design accountability systems to keep such tendencies in check (Beu & Buckley, 
2001, 2004; Grant & Keohane, 2005; Montesquieu, 1748; Rawls, 2005). For instance, 
political power is regulated through the democratic process and the accountability to voters. It 
is possible that such institutional arrangements change how power affects individuals. In this 
vein, Fiske and Berdahl (2007) note that “More research needs to study power in context—not 
as an individual attribute or orientation that exists independent of a social relationship but as a 
socially relative and situated phenomenon. By studying power in the context of actual 
interacting social systems…research can also shed light on how the effects of power on 
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individual tendencies manifest themselves in the presence of others” (p. 688). In this research, 
we examine whether accountability systems can be used to restrain the self-serving 
consequences of power. Below, we propose how different accountability systems can be used 
both to regulate self-serving decisions under moral hazard as well as to limit the negative 
consequences of power.  
Accountability as a Regulatory Mechanism  
The social contingency model suggests that accountability, de!ned as the “expectation 
that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999, p. 225), is a universal feature of decision making; no decision with potentially 
negative social consequences takes place in a vacuum. Instead, individuals’ behavior is 
regulated by holding them accountable for their decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003; Semin & 
Manstead, 1983; Tetlock, 1985). For instance, organizations regulate problematic behaviors 
using both formal and informal systems, such as performance evaluation systems and codes of 
ethical conduct, that “communicate behavioral and accountability expectations” (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010, p. 7).  
Two main types of accountability have been distinguished: procedural accountability 
and outcome accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). 
Procedural accountability means that individuals have to account for the ways in which 
judgments and decisions were made. Under outcome accountability, the results of individuals’ 
decisions are the criteria by which decisions are assessed. Research on organizational control 
systems is consistent with this conceptualization and suggests that, in organizations, the 
appropriateness of employees’ decisions is assessed either based on the outcomes of the 
decisions or on the procedure used to make the decision (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1977; 
Thompson, 1967). 
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Past research on behavior under moral hazard has argued that it is often more efficient 
to make the agent accountable for outcomes because they can be easier to observe 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Harris & Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979). Consistent with 
this idea, most organizations rely on outcome-based accountability systems (Merchant & Van 
der Stede, 2007; Rynes et al., 2005). For instance, hedge fund managers’ investment decisions 
are assessed based on the gains they make, rather than on the process used to reach the 
decision (Ackermann et al., 1999; Stulz, 2007).  
In contrast, we propose that procedural accountability might be a more effective way 
to regulate self-serving decisions than is outcome accountability. Research shows that 
outcome accountability and procedural accountability direct one’s focus toward different 
aspects of decisions (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Outcome 
accountability directs the decision maker’s focus primarily toward the expected outcome of 
the decision, at the expense of analyzing the appropriateness of the decision itself. On the 
other hand, procedural accountability makes it more likely for the decision maker to consider 
how the decision itself appears to others. For this reason, we expect procedural accountability 
to be relatively more effective than outcome accountability in limiting self-serving decisions 
under moral hazard.  
Consider the example of an investor who is deciding whether to place others’ funds in 
a potentially problematic project and who can earn a commission in case the investment 
generates profits, but who does not suffer a loss in case of failure. Under procedural 
accountability, the investor will anticipate that he or she will have to explain whether the 
decision itself is appropriate. As the investor is likely to know that the very act of making a 
reckless investment could be judged as inappropriate by those whom he or she is representing, 
the investor should be less likely to make a self-serving decision under procedural 
accountability (Beu & Buckley, 2001; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In contrast, such “preemptive 
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self-criticism” (Tetlock, 1983, p. 81) is less likely to occur under outcome accountability, 
where the decision maker might justify the decision by referring to a possible positive 
outcome of the decision, making it relatively more likely for the decision maker to engage in 
self-serving behavior under outcome accountability than under procedural accountability. We 
predict: 
Hypothesis 2: Procedural accountability, compared to outcome accountability, leads to 
less self-serving investment decisions under moral hazard. 
The hypothesized reduction in self-serving decisions as a result of procedural 
accountability (compared to outcome accountability) may be greater for powerful individuals, 
as research shows that they tend to respond to such changes in situational focus more strongly 
(Guinote, 2007, 2008, 2010). For instance, Guinote (2008) found that powerful individuals, 
compared to powerless individuals, acted in ways that are more consistent with an 
experimenter-induced situational focus, such as reporting more work-related activities when 
answering what they would do in an imagined internship situation and more social-related 
activities when answering what they would do in an imagined social situation. These findings 
suggest that although it can be expected that procedural accountability, compared to outcome 
accountability, will decrease individuals’ self-serving decisions regardless of the level of 
power, this decrease should be stronger for the powerful due to their increased responsiveness 
to changes in the situational focus (Guinote, 2007, 2008, 2010). This means that the increase 
in self-serving decisions as a function of power should be weaker under procedural 
accountability than under outcome accountability. We predict that: 
Hypothesis 3: Accountability type moderates the effect of power on self-serving 
decisions under moral hazard such that power leads to more self-serving decisions 
under outcome accountability, but this effect is attenuated under procedural 
accountability.  
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Study 1: Financial Investment Recommendations  
Methods 
Participants and design. Undergraduate students (N = 152, Mage = 21.04, SD = 1.67; 
59% female) volunteered to participate in the experiment at the end of international business 
class sessions. We asked participants to respond individually to the experimental materials, 
using pen and paper. The packages were randomly ordered and distributed in advance based 
on a 2 (power: high vs. control) X 2 (accountability: procedural vs. outcome) between-
subjects design. 
Procedure and materials 
Power manipulation. Participants’ sense of power was manipulated using a priming 
procedure (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Participants wrote a narrative essay about 
an incident in their lives, ostensibly as part of a study focusing on past experiences. In the 
high power condition, participants recalled an incident in which they had power over another 
individual or individuals; in the control condition, they recalled a trip to a grocery store. 
Financial investment decisions under moral hazard. Next, participants were 
informed that they would take part in an unrelated study examining behavior in an 
organizational setting. They were instructed to respond to a scenario involving an investment 
opportunity under moral hazard: 
An investor working for a large financial services company is presented with an 
opportunity to invest his clients’ funds in a new project. There is scant information 
regarding the project, other than favorable comments from the person promoting the 
project, but this situation is not completely uncommon in this industry. There is no 
penalty if money is lost, and the investor is entitled to a sizeable commission if the 
investment generates profit. The investor has a limit of "1M for this transaction. 
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Accountability manipulation. Consistent with previous research (Brtek & Motowidlo, 
2002; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), before responding to the scenario, participants in the 
procedural accountability condition were told: “After the experiment, you will have to 
explain to the researchers the decision-making procedure used to respond to the scenario,” 
and participants in the outcome accountability condition were told: “After the experiment, you 
will have to explain to the researchers your responses to the scenario focusing on the expected 
outcomes.” 
Dependent variable. Participants indicated an amount in euros between 0 and 
1,000,000 that they thought the investor should invest in the project. 
Manipulation checks. Following previous research (Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; 
Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), the effectiveness of the accountability manipulation was 
checked using the following two questions: “When you made your decision, did you believe 
you were going to have to justify the outcome of your decision to researchers?” and “When 
you made your decision, did you believe you would have to justify the process of reaching the 
decision to researchers?” (1 = definitely did not believe to 7 = definitely believed). 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. Power X accountability ANOVAs indicated that the level of 
felt procedural accountability was higher in the procedural (than outcome) accountability 
condition (p < .001) and the level of felt outcome accountability was higher in the outcome 
(than procedural) accountability condition (p < .001). No other effects were significant (ps > 
.327).
1
 
Power and accountability. Figure 1 displays recommended investment amounts per 
condition. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of accountability: under outcome 
accountability (M = "472,750.00, SD = "125,497.10), participants recommended larger 
investments than under procedural accountability (M = "357,039.47, SD = "141,341.61), F(1, 
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148) = 31.87, p < .001, !
2
 = .177. The interaction between power and accountability was 
significant, F(1, 148) = 5.86, p = .017, !
2 
= .038. Simple effects analysis revealed that 
participants primed with power recommended significantly larger investments when they 
were accountable for the outcomes of their decisions (power: M = "535,868.42, SD = 
"117,450.43; control: M = "409,631.58, SD = "99,734.08), F(1, 148) = 18.96, p < .001, !p
2 
= 
.113, but not when they were accountable for the decision-making procedure (power: M = 
"370,526.32, SD = "153,740.70; control: M = "343,552.63, SD = "128,393.97), F(1, 148) = 
0.87, p = .354, !p
2 
= .006. This pattern of results supports Hypotheses 1–3. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Study 2: Lawyers Recommend Self-Serving Investments  
Study 2 extended the findings of Study 1 by testing our theory among a sample of 
lawyers. Lawyers are one of the so-called traditional professions who are trained and 
regulated by professional bodies to perform tasks of important social value and to act as 
guardians of their clients’ interests (Abbott, 1988; Spencer, 1896). Lawyers regularly face 
situations in which they have an opportunity to make self-serving decisions at the expense of 
the interest of those whom they are representing (Sharma, 1997) and they are trained and 
professionally obligated to avoid self-serving decisions under moral hazard. Therefore, by 
testing our predictions among this sample, we provide a conservative and ecologically valid 
test of our theory. 
Methods 
Participants and design. We sent e-mails to 507 lawyers and asked them to 
participate in an online study on legal decision making. We obtained their contact information 
through the website of their bar association. Thirty-nine email addresses were invalid, leaving 
a total of 468 valid requests. Sixty-three lawyers completed the study (13.46% response rate). 
Mean age was 32.24 (SD = 6.72) and 57.14% were male. Participants followed a link to an 
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online study where they were randomly assigned to one of the two accountability conditions 
(outcome vs. procedural). 
Procedure and materials 
Power measure. We measured power with items developed by Anderson and Galinsky 
(2006) to assess individuals’ subjective sense of power. Consistent with past research (See, 
Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011), we used four items (1 = disagree strongly, 7 = agree 
strongly): “I can get people to listen to what I say,” “I can get others to do what I want,” “I 
think I have a great deal of power,” “If I want to, I get to make the decisions,” # = .89. 
Financial investment decisions under moral hazard. Next, we asked participants to 
consider how they would respond if they had been hired by a foreign investor to assess 
potential legal risks associated with a prospective investment in a hotel complex: 
A legal analysis has been performed and you are now expected to make a 
recommendation on whether the investor should go ahead with the investment or not. 
Several potential legal issues that could threaten a smooth development of the project 
(which is what the investor is hoping for) have been discovered. There is a chance for 
several minor legal complications, such as those related to construction permits, and 
there is also a possibility of major complications, such as possible property-related 
claims from third parties. If the project is financially profitable, you will be 
compensated for your services by receiving a percentage share of the investor’s profit 
from the project. In case the project fails, however, you will not suffer a financial loss. 
Accountability manipulation. Before responding to the scenario, in the procedural 
accountability condition, participants read: “Your decisions will be assessed by your 
organization based on the decision-making procedure you followed when making the 
decision.” In the outcome accountability condition, they read: “Your decision will be assessed 
by your organization based on the outcomes the decision produces.” 
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Dependent variable. Participants then indicated whether they, as lawyers, would 
recommend that the investor proceed with the investment under these circumstances (1 = 
definitely would not recommend, 7 = definitely would recommend).  
Manipulation checks. Finally, we checked the effectiveness of the accountability 
manipulation by asking: “Will your decision be assessed focusing on the outcome of the 
decision?” and “Will your decision be assessed focusing on the decision-making procedure?” 
(1 = disagree strongly, 7 = agree strongly). 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. We regressed the two manipulation checks on the 
accountability manipulation, the power measure, and their interaction. The accountability 
manipulation was successful: The level of felt procedural accountability was higher in the 
procedural (than outcome) accountability condition (p < .001) and the level of felt outcome 
accountability was higher in the outcome (than procedural) accountability condition (p < 
.001). Power had no effect (ps > .618) and did not interact with accountability (ps > .333). 
Power and accountability. We regressed participants’ willingness to recommend the 
investment on their sense of power, the accountability manipulation (0 = outcome, 1 = 
procedural), and their interaction (variables were mean centered for interpretational purposes; 
Aiken & West, 1991). Procedural accountability (compared to outcome accountability) 
significantly decreased participants’ willingness to recommend the investment, b = -0.81, p = 
.011. The interaction between power and accountability was significant, b = -0.50, p = .049, 
and an analysis of conditional effects revealed that power significantly increased participants’ 
willingness to recommend the investment under outcome accountability, b = 0.50, p = .004, 
but had no effect under procedural accountability, b = 0.01, p = .972 (see Figure 2 for simple 
slopes within the two accountability conditions). The results thus support Hypotheses 1–3.
2
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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Study 3: The Boss Invests Other Participants’ Money 
Study 3 extended previous studies in several ways. Instead of measuring self-serving 
investment decisions under moral hazard using hypothetical situations, in Study 3, 
participants were given an opportunity to invest other participants’ participation fees. 
Therefore, participants’ self-serving decisions under moral hazard ostensibly had a tangible 
impact on other people. Another goal of Study 3 was to constructively replicate our results 
using different manipulations of the independent variables. In Study 3, we manipulated power 
structurally, by assigning participants to either a high power role (“manager”) or a neutral role 
(“coworker”). We also used a different accountability manipulation. We asked participants to 
justify their decisions to the ones who were, by design, affected by their investment 
decisions—i.e., other participants (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, De Cremer, & de Rooij, 
2007). This manipulation is a more ecologically valid manipulation of accountability, as 
participants are more likely to believe that those judging their behavior care about the 
appropriateness of their decisions (De Cremer & Barker, 2003; Kerr, 1999). 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and four undergraduate students (Mage = 20.48, 
SD = 0.57; 58.65% male) participated in a lab experiment for a show-up fee and an 
opportunity to earn additional monetary compensation. They were tested individually, each 
seated in front of a computer. All instructions and materials were presented on the computer 
screen. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions of a 2 (power: high vs. control) X 2 
(accountability: procedural vs. outcome) between-subjects design.  
Materials and procedure 
Power manipulation. Power was manipulated by announcing that in an upcoming 
task, participants would act either as managers who were supervising and making decisions 
that would affect their subordinates (high power condition), or as coworkers who would be 
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working together with their peers and having an equal decision-making authority (control 
condition; e.g., Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). To strengthen the 
manipulation, participants were provided with badges, folders, and bogus task reports, all 
indicating their role (manager or coworker) and emphasizing their decision-making authority 
(e.g., “You are in charge” vs. “You work together with others”) in the upcoming task. We 
informed participants that each group consisted of them plus five other participants. 
Following the power manipulation, participants were told they would engage in an unrelated 
task while waiting for other participants to join them for the group task.  
Financial investment decisions under moral hazard. Next, all participants were told 
that they had been randomly selected to decide on an investment opportunity (“the investor”) 
with which the group was presented. Specifically, participants were told that the group had 
the opportunity to invest any portion of their participation fees, with a 50% chance of 
doubling their participation fees and a 50% chance of losing them. The only exception would 
be the investor, who would not invest his or her own money (and, hence, could not suffer a 
loss), but would be awarded an “investor’s fee,” in case of a financial gain, in the amount of 
20% of the total gains (e.g., "5 if the investor invested the maximum amount of "25 from the 
other five group members’ participation fees and then won). This setup ostensibly put 
participants under moral hazard as they had an incentive to invest as much as possible of 
others’ funds, while they were insulated from losses themselves.  
Accountability manipulation. Prior to making their investment decisions, participants 
in the procedural (outcome) accountability condition were told: “You will have to explain 
your investment decision, focusing on how you made the decision (on the outcomes of the 
decision), to other group members.”  
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Dependent variable. Following the accountability manipulation, participants indicated 
how much of other group members’ participation fees they wanted to invest, ranging from 0 = 
none to 25 = everything.  
Manipulation checks. Finally, participants responded to two questions: “When you 
made your decision, did you believe you were going to have to justify the outcome of your 
decision to other group members?” and “When you made your decision, did you believe you 
would have to justify the process of reaching the decision to other group members?” (1 = 
definitely did not believe to 7 = definitely believed). 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. Power X accountability ANOVAs indicated that the level of 
felt procedural accountability was higher in the procedural (than outcome) accountability 
condition (p < .001) and the level of felt outcome accountability was higher in the outcome 
(than procedural) accountability condition (p < .001). No other effects were significant (ps > 
.461). 
Power and accountability. Investment amounts were submitted to a 2 (power: high vs. 
control) X 2 (accountability: procedural vs. outcome) ANOVA. Means are presented in 
Figure 3. There was a significant main effect of accountability such that participants made 
larger investments under outcome accountability (M = 12.96, SD = 6.69) than under 
procedural accountability (M = 6.00, SD = 4.95), F(1, 100) = 37.62, p < .001, !p
2 
= .273. The 
interaction between power and accountability was significant, F(1, 100) = 5.15, p = .025, !
2 
= 
.049, such that power led to significantly larger investments under outcome accountability 
(power: M = 14.62, SD = 7.08; control: M = 11.31, SD = 5.96), F(1, 100) = 4.25, p = .042, 
!p
2
= .041, but not under procedural accountability (power: M = 5.08, SD = 5.18; control: M = 
6.92, SD = 4.64), F(1, 100) = 1.32, p = .253, !p
2
= .013. This pattern of results supports 
Hypotheses 1–3. 
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General Discussion 
Three studies provide support for our theory. Power leads to more self-serving 
decisions under moral hazard, and procedural accountability, compared to outcome 
accountability, leads to less self-serving decisions under moral hazard and curbs the negative 
consequences of power. 
Our findings contribute to the understanding of self-serving behavior under moral 
hazard (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Pauly, 1968) and unethical behavior in organizations more 
generally (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). We advance past explanations, which did not explain 
why some individuals abuse their position under moral hazard while others refrain from such 
behavior (Chiappori et al., 1998; Dionne & St-Michel, 1991; Miller & Whitford, 2002). Past 
research also did not explain why some accountability arrangements deter self-serving 
behavior while others fail to do so (Conlon & Parks, 1990; Dickinson & Villeval, 2008; Tosi 
et al., 1997). Our findings demonstrate that decision makers’ power and the manner in which 
they are held accountable can help explain these questions. We sought to provide a robust test 
of the hypothesized causal relations (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982; Mook, 1983) and future 
research is needed to examine the relative explanatory power of this model in the field. Our 
findings also emphasize the potential for future research to examine the psychological 
consequences of other factors that define situations involving moral hazard. Research could 
draw on recent findings in moral psychology (e.g., Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009) to examine 
how an agent’s propensity to engage in self-serving behavior is affected by the salient 
examples of other agents and thus to model behavior under moral hazard on a wider scale.  
Our results also contribute to the power literature (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; 
Malhotra & Gino, 2011) by demonstrating the importance of considering people’s broader 
social context for understanding the psychological consequences of power (Fiske & Berdahl, 
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2007). Past research found that power can lead to more problematic behavior (e.g., greater 
risk taking, see Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and we fund similar results when participants 
were accountable for the outcomes of their decisions. However, when people are held 
procedurally accountable, power does not cause problematic behavior. Future research should 
consider whether the psychological consequences of power (and perhaps many of the findings 
that have been documented in previous research) change when the powerful are made 
procedurally accountable for their actions .  
Our results are also relevant for the accountability literature. Scant work has been done 
on the effect of different types of accountability on unethical behavior (Beu & Buckley, 2001, 
2004; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Our research demonstrates the potential of accountability 
research to contribute to the understanding of such behavior. More importantly, by 
demonstrating that procedural accountability is more effective at regulating problematic 
behavior than is outcome accountability, our findings challenge the appropriateness of 
outcome accountability as the dominant form of accountability in organizations (Merchant & 
Van der Stede, 2007; Rynes et al., 2005). Future research could compare the effectiveness of 
the two types of accountability in other domains of organizationally relevant interpersonal 
behavior, such as interpersonal deviance and free-riding. 
Finally, our findings have important practical implications. A direct implication of our 
finding is that basing different organizational systems intended to deter problematic employee 
conduct on procedural accountability should be more effective than relying on the outcome 
accountability model. Organizations should therefore base their regulatory mechanisms on 
procedural rather than outcome accountability, including their codes of conduct (Somers, 
2001), practices related to the enforcement of these norms (Beets & Killough, 1990), and 
sanctioning systems (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Study 1 Mean Recommended Investments under Moral Hazard by Power and 
Accountability. Error Bars Represent Standard Errors. 
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Figure 2. Study 2 Simple Slopes for Lawyers’ Willingness to Recommend the Investment 
Under Moral Hazard. 
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Figure 3. Study 3 Mean Investments Under Moral Hazard by Power and Accountability. Error 
Bars Represent Standard Errors. 
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Footnotes 
1
 We did not include a power manipulation check in our studies because we used 
manipulations that were extensively validated (e.g., Fast et al., 2009; Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Guinote, 2007, 2008; See et al., 2011). Nevertheless, we checked the effectiveness of the 
power manipulation used in Study 1 in a supplementary data collection with 158 participants 
(Mage = 30.13, SD = 11.31, 53.42% male) from an online subject pool representative of the 
U.S. population (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). After the power manipulation, 
participants responded to four-items (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree): “Right 
now, I feel… ‘in charge’ (Weick & Guinote, 2010), ‘I have a great deal of power’ (Kraus, 
Chen, & Keltner, 2011), ‘influential’ (Ng, 1980), ‘independent’ (Duguid & Goncalo, 2012), # 
= .82. Participants in the power condition felt more powerful (M = 5.17, SD = 1.00) than did 
participants in the control condition (M = 4.67, SD = 1.12), p = .007. 
2
 We selected the outcome accountability condition as a conservative (Cooper & 
Richardson, 1986) and ecologically valid (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Rynes et al., 
2005; Tetlock, 1985) control condition. We also conducted two supplementary data 
collections that constructively replicated Studies 1 and 2 and included an additional no-
accountability control condition, in which the sentence informing participants that they would 
have to justify their decision was omitted (Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 
1996). Participant characteristics of the supplementary data collection replicating Study 1 are 
described in Footnote 1. Participants of the supplementary data collection replicating Study 2 
were 109 (non-overlapping) lawyers (Mage = 37.39, SD = 8.92, 67.00% male) recruited using 
the same procedure as in Study 2. Consistent with our reasoning, both studies found that 
power led to more self-serving decisions under both the outcome accountability and no 
accountability conditions. As in Studies 1–3, the effect of power was only attenuated in the 
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procedural accountability condition. Detailed results of these two supplementary data 
collections are available from the first author.
 
